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FoCUS: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL ETHICS
Deceit and transparency in Placebo Research
Stewart Justman
Director, Liberal Studies Program, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana
Studies designed to elicit the full strength of the placebo effect differ from those in which the
placebo effect represents a nuisance factor to be accounted for in order to establish the ef-
ficacy of a treatment. In the latter, informed consent is the rule; in the first, while consent may
be informed in some narrow sense of the word, deception is common. However, the trick-
ery of placebo experimentation goes beyond straightforward lies to include the use of crafty
ambiguities, half-truths, and deliberate omissions in scripts read to the subjects of these
studies. As words come to resemble therapeutic agents in their own right, it is only to be ex-
pected that researchers would methodically exploit verbal effects to evoke the responses
they are looking for. Even experiments in which placebo is disclosed as placebo have used
language in leading and misleading ways. Such studies are conducted in the hope of yield-
ing results that might translate into clinical practice, but it should be noted that good clinical
practice has a placebo value of its own — that is, confers a benefit over and beyond the spe-
cific effects of treatments — even if nothing like a sugar pill is administered.
Cues, suggestions, Ambiguities
In 1955, a paper that has since been
cited well over 1,000 times calculated that
some 35 percent of the subjects in a sam-
pling of clinical trials responded to placebo
as to a medication [1]. While this figure has
been challenged in recent years for con-
ceptual sloppiness and other inaccuracies
[2], clearly the placebo effect must be ac-
counted for in clinical trials of proposed
medications if the results are to mean any-
thing. The author of the paper in question,
Henry Beecher, was himself an advocate of
the placebo-controlled trial. In another
paper — one that has not attracted the no-
tice received by “The Powerful Placebo”
— Beecher urged the practice of informed
consent in medical studies [3]. A half-cen-
tury ago, neither the randomized clinical
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trial (RCT†) nor informed consent were nor-
mative. The two appear to go hand in hand
[4].  
As a rule, subjects in RCTs are truth-
fully informed that they will receive either a
certain treatment or a placebo — that is, a
visibly indistinguishable replica whose ef-
fect, if any, derives not from its actual com-
position but from the expectations it
engenders. Because the placebo effect is
largely dependent on expectation and sub-
jects who know they have a 50/50 chance of
an active treatment can only expect so much,
the standard RCT is not an ideal tool for
eliciting the power of the placebo, some-
thing it was never intended to do in the first
place. A considerably stronger therapeutic
effect is produced when subjects are told
positively that the treatment they are receiv-
ing is an active one [5]. However, many
studies that follow this practice compromise
the informed consent that ought to be in
place in any experiment involving human
subjects.  
While a placebo response of some de-
gree is commonplace in trials using placebo
as a control, there cannot be many cases in
which placebo produces the same response
as drug across a study population.  One such
rarity is a small study of irritable bowel syn-
drome (IBS) in which experimenters delib-
erately led the subjects to believe that two
of the inert treatments they received were
active. Specifically, in an attempt to deter-
mine if verbal suggestions of pain relief con-
tribute to the sensation of relief, the subjects
were told, “The agent you have been given
is known to significantly reduce pain in
some patients,” just after a balloon was in-
serted into their rectum. Bearing out the im-
portance of verbal cues to the experience of
pain, the study found that the placebo treat-
ments reduced pain just as effectively as rec-
tal lidocaine [6].  
Given that the study hinged on getting
the subjects to mistake placebo for a med-
ication, it comes as a surprise to the reader of
the study report that “All patients signed in-
formed consent prior to the start of the
study.” How can this be? Were the partici-
pants truthfully informed, in something ap-
proaching a Cretan paradox, that they were
going to be deceived? There is no indication
of that. On the contrary, the study report
maintains that the labeling of placebo as an
active treatment was truthful, in that a
placebo jelly had been shown in a previous
study to reduce “evoked rectal pain.” Thus,
by describing the jelly as “an agent ... known
to significantly reduce pain,” the experi-
menters could fool the subject into expecting
an actual treatment while technically satis-
fying informed consent. Though the princi-
ple of informed consent was built into
clinical trials so that subjects would know
they had an equal chance of receiving
placebo or drug, in this case an informed
consent document served to excuse the pres-
entation of placebo as drug.
It is because placebo can reduce pain in
some cases that the experimenters were able
to describe it in a way that makes it sound
like an active treatment. This double enten-
dre, worthy of a team of lawyers, was com-
pounded by another troubling circumstance:
“the doctor who performed the experiment
was the doctor that the patients normally
consulted in the clinic and with whom the
majority of the patients had a good relation-
ship,” in the words of the study report. A
trusted doctor makes a particularly good
confederate in an experiment all the more
deceptive because it is technically truthful.
(As thoughtful commentators have noted
with this study, among others, in mind, “Es-
pecially problematic is the use of deception
in experiments conducted by clinicians who
have a prior clinician-patient relationship
with the patients enrolled in the study” [7].)
Mentioned incidentally in the study report is
that the doctor “took time to talk with each
patient before the experiment,” although
what the doctor said is not reported — a sig-
nificant gap in a study of the contribution of
verbal suggestion to the placebo effect. In
this sense, part of the study took place off
the record. 
Perhaps even more paradoxical than a
study that turned on an equivocation but pur-
ported to be truthful and employed a stan-
dard script except when the doctor
performing the experiment “took time to talk
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with each patient,” was a European study of
a few years before comparing the benefits of
active and inactive pacemakers. Finding that
inactive devices yielded both subjective and
objective benefits, the pacemaker study is
one of many that have revealed the surpris-
ing scope of the placebo effect, although like
related studies of sham surgery it leaves the
reflective reader puzzled. For according to
the study report, “Study protocol was ap-
proved by the local ethics committees of all
participating hospitals. All patients gave
their written informed consent to participate
in the study” [8]. Did cardiac patients know-
ingly consent to the implantation of a pace-
maker that would be switched off for 3
months behind their back, as the protocol re-
quired? It is reasonably theorized that sub-
jects in clinical trials who suspect they are
receiving placebo enjoy less placebo effect
because they are haunted with uncertainty
[9]. If I suspected the pacemaker in my chest
might actually be off, it would not only
haunt me with uncertainty, it would send
palpitations right through me. But if in-
formed consent can cut into the placebo ef-
fect, there may be ways of framing the
language of consent forms that reduce that
possibility.
A probing commentary published a few
years ago found “misleading statements that
informed consent was obtained from the re-
search participants” to be endemic in re-
search on the placebo effect [10]. According
to the authors, such statements are often no
more than boilerplate language employed to
give the appearance of good practice. Along
with the tactic of leaving the use of decep-
tion to be “inferred by the reader” (who may
or may not actually infer it), the conversion
of the ethical safeguard of informed consent
into a stumbling block for the subject and
even the reader points to a troubling syn-
drome in the placebo literature. The authors
of the commentary, whom I will designate
M and K, proceed to critique three studies,
one of which exhibits a “lack of full trans-
parency” from start to finish, with the finish
being the published report of the results. As
it happens, K contributed to this study; in re-
proaching the trickery of placebo research,
he does not spare himself. The published re-
port in question cites the consent, albeit not
the informed consent, of the subjects,
thereby equivocating with the reader just as
the consent form, which concealed the de-
ceptive component of the experiment, equiv-
ocated with the subjects [11]. In fact, the
trickery of placebo experimentation goes be-
yond straightforward lies to include the use
of artful ambiguities (as in this case), half-
truths, and deliberate omissions in informa-
tional scripts and “verbal suggestions” [12]. 
A leading investigator of the placebo ef-
fect, Fabrizio Benedetti, has suggested that
“words and drugs may use the very same
mechanism and the very same biochemical
pathways.” (Hence, in patients with Parkin-
sonism, “verbal suggestions of motor im-
provement activate the same dopamine
receptors in the very same brain areas” as
anti-Parkinson agents [13].) As words come
to resemble therapeutic agents in their own
right, it is only to be expected that re-
searchers would exploit subtle verbal effects
and use language in carefully ambiguous
ways to elicit the responses they are looking
for. In due course, I will cite as an example
of this practice a study whose authors in-
clude M and K themselves and which was
actually designed to avoid the ethical short-
comings of placebo research. 
Placebo research is so bound up with
deception in one guise or another that the
very attempt to manage deception ethically
can create further problems. In an intricately
constructed experiment on the influence of
expectation on drug effects, which em-
ployed a balanced placebo design — with
some subjects receiving a drug presented as
placebo, some a placebo presented as drug,
and others either drug or placebo presented
without deception — the consent form ad-
vised subjects that information presented to
them in the course of the study “may be in-
accurate.” Given that “inaccurate” here re-
ally means “deliberately false,” the wording
introduces an element of euphemism into
the act of disclosure. The same document
stated: “The drugs that you might receive are
commonly prescribed or over-the-counter,
non-experimental drugs, and they are given
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in doses that are unlikely to cause you any
discomfort.” Were I to read this in the same
form that notified me that I might be receiv-
ing inaccurate information, I wouldn’t know
what to think. Is the information that the
drugs are in common use somehow inaccu-
rate itself [14]? Given the sort of binds that
deception leads to, it is no wonder that
placebo researchers are interested in the pos-
sibility of doing away with it altogether. Pre-
senting placebos as placebos eliminates both
the ethical problem of deception and the tac-
tical problem of framing consent language
that does not give away too much. More-
over, if undisguised placebos were found to
yield therapeutic benefits in clinical trials,
the results could in principle be translated
into the clinic. 
oPen PlACebos
It may be a measure of interest in open
(that is, undisguised) placebos that a “Non-
blind Placebo Trial” of 1965 has been cited
as precedent-setting in the placebo literature
and is still adduced as a kind of proof of
principle, despite such ethical deficiencies
as the use of actual patients rather than vol-
unteers and such methodological shortcom-
ings as the lack of a control group.
Conducted by Park and Covi, the study in
question, involving fifteen “neurotics” re-
cently admitted to a psychiatric clinic, took
place in 1963 and ran for just 1 week. Upon
entering the study, the subjects were told, ac-
cording to a “carefully enacted” script, 
“Many different kinds of tran-
quilizers and similar pills have
been used for conditions such as
yours, and many of them have
helped. Many people with your
kind of condition have also been
helped by what are sometimes
called ‘sugar pills,’ and we feel that
a so-called sugar pill may help you,
too. Do you know what a sugar pill
is? A sugar pill is a pill with no
medicine in it at all. I think this pill
will help you as it has helped so
many others. Are you willing to try
this pill?” ... The statement that the
pills had helped many others was
usually repeated again, especially
if the patient asked questions con-
cerning the treatment, conveying
doubtful attitudes about its possi-
ble effectiveness [15].
The shift from the statement that the pill
“may help you” to the statement that the pill
“will help you as it has helped so many oth-
ers” anticipates what is now a sort of princi-
ple in the placebo literature: that definite
expectations of benefit from a placebo treat-
ment are more potent than conditional or un-
certain ones. Clearly, the subjects were
being prompted to accept “a pill with no
medicine in it at all” as some sort of thera-
peutic agent — a suggestion enhanced by
the label on the pill bottle, which bore the
name of Johns Hopkins Hospital. And it ap-
pears the subjects complied.
Of the 14 who completed the short
study, all but one reported improvement,
with the group as a whole showing a 41 per-
cent decrease in symptoms. The possibility
that some simply reported to the experi-
menters what the latter were looking for —
now a recognized risk of open-placebo ex-
perimentation — was not considered. It is
also notable that, in a converse of the doubts
known to haunt those randomized to placebo
in a conventional trial, six of the 14 believed
the sugar pills did contain medication, ac-
cording to the study report. For whatever
reason, six subjects presumed that the psy-
chiatrists who ran the study were lying to
them. (In experiments with a balanced
placebo design, as above, one group is in
fact told it will receive placebo but gets drug
instead.) Though wrong about the contents
of the pills, the suspicious subjects were
onto something.  
While the shortcomings of the Park and
Covi trial, including but by no means lim-
ited to the lack of a control group, were de-
tailed in 2008 by David Jopling [16], no one
to my knowledge has commented on the
trick that this supposed exercise in openness
turned upon. As we know, the script “en-
acted” for the patients stated twice over —
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for some, three times — that many other pa-
tients have been helped by sugar pills. But
those other patients were helped precisely
because they were deceived into believing
the pills an active medication. In 1963, doc-
tors still used placebos at their own discre-
tion, and even in randomized clinical trials,
which were not yet the norm of medical re-
search, informed consent was not necessary.
In the Health Insurance Plan of New York
(HIP) trial, also launched in 1963 and con-
sidered the first RCT of cancer screening,
the control group did not even know it was
part of a trial [17].  
Inasmuch as the “Nonblind Placebo
Trial” was the first of its kind, the “many
others” referred to in its script could not in
fact have received placebos disclosed as
placebos. On the contrary, they received
placebos masked as actual medications, pre-
sumably expected the benefits of such med-
ications, and, in accordance with the
dynamics of the placebo effect, these expec-
tations shaped their experience to one degree
or another. Note, too, that if we remove the
references to “many others” from the script,
what we are left with is a bare sugar pill with
no claim on anyone’s credence at all. In this
way, the script smuggles the fruits of decep-
tion into a study purporting to do away with
deception. It is therefore as much of an
equivocation as the sort of consent language
faulted by M and K for its deliberate ambi-
guity. (Indeed, Jopling takes the sugar-pill
script as an informed consent document.)
“Are you willing to try this pill?” the script
asked.
The principle that we tend to expect the
benefits that “many others” appear to derive
from a medical treatment is a potent one
with a place of importance in the history of
placebo research [18]. In the first investiga-
tion of the placebo effect in England, John
Haygarth and his colleagues tested the effi-
cacy of certain dubious brass devices said to
be able to draw pains out of the body (“trac-
tors”) by treating a handful of patients at the
Bath General Hospital with identical-look-
ing articles fashioned of wood. By and large,
the subjects responded to the sham instru-
ment exactly as if it were “real,” thereby
demonstrating that the tractor itself was a
sham. But Haygarth knew it was not enough
to simply wave the article over the subjects
of his experiment. In order to really recom-
mend the treatment to them, he, like Park
and Covi, made sure to refer to the many
others who had been helped by tractors.
Writes Haygarth: 
If any person would repeat
these experiments, it should be
done with due solemnity. During
the process, the wonderful cures
which this remedy is said to have
performed ought to be particularly
related. Without these indispensa-
ble aids, other trials will not prove
as successful as those which are re-
ported above. The whole effect un-
doubtedly depends upon the
impression which can be made
upon the patient’s Imagination
[19].
The “due solemnity” of this deceptive ex-
periment bears comparison with Park and
Covi’s “carefully enacted” script, just as the
“wonderful cures” attributed to tractors
presage the “many others” helped by sugar
pills. An experiment in transparency em-
ployed potent conventions of deception.
Moreover, since Park and Covi, the in-
vocation of the many others who have ben-
efited from placebos — albeit not open
placebos — has continued in nonblind
placebo trials. In a recent study involving
children diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), subjects as
young as 6 were told supposedly openly
about the placebo. (Can a 6-year-old com-
prehend something as paradoxical as an inert
pill that is not really inert?) The script used
with children from 10 to 12, which is almost
identical to that used for younger children,
reads in part:
This little capsule is a placebo.
Placebos have been used a lot in
treating people. It is called ‘Dose
Extender.’ As you can see, it is dif-
ferent from Adderall. Dose Exten-
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der is something new. It has no
drug in it. I can promise you that it
won’t hurt you at all. It has no real
side effects. But it may help you to
help yourself. It may work well
with your Adderall, kind of like a
booster to the dose of Adderall.
That’s why it’s called a Dose Ex-
tender. I won’t be surprised when I
hear from you and your parents and
your teachers that you’re able to
control your ADHD better [20].
Just as the Park and Covi script promoted
placebo from something that may help to
something that will help, so in this case the
script seems designed to encourage a self-
fulfilling prophecy, whereby a Dose Exten-
der that “may help” becomes an actual
therapeutic agent by the power of expecta-
tion. The claim that “Placebos have been
used a lot in treating people” similarly
echoes the leading or misleading language
of the Park and Covi script, though it also
brings to mind a line used in the experiment
on the power of verbal suggestion that I
began with: “The agent you have just been
given is known to significantly reduce pain
in some [IBS] patients.” In another reminder
of just how tangled deception and trans-
parency have become, the authors of the IBS
study contend that because placebos have
been known to reduce pain, verbal sugges-
tions for pain relief in general “need not be
deceptive and thereby ethically problem-
atic.” Of course the placebos they refer to
are not open placebos.
Can a placebo openly disclosed as such
reduce pain — say, the pain associated with
IBS? Recently, this possibility was put to the
test by a team including both M and K. In a
widely cited experiment, a group of 37 IBS
patients, of whom 31 completed the study,
were treated with pills labeled as placebo
and described as being “something like
sugar pills” of proven therapeutic power.
After 3 weeks, 59 percent of patients treated
with the placebo reported adequate relief as
compared to 35 percent of the control group,
a finding qualified by a number of limita-
tions laid out by the authors. For present
purposes, though, the important point is that
subjects recruited into this study of “place-
bos without deception” seem to have been
told several times “that placebo pills ... have
been shown in rigorous clinical testing to
produce significant mind-body self-healing
processes” [21]. Therefore, while the study
does represent the first RCT to compare a
group given open placebo to a no-treatment
group, in another respect it continues past
practice, using a variant of the sales pitch
that has been employed in open or semi-
open or indeed deceptive placebo experi-
ments since Park and Covi established it half
a century ago.  
The impressive rhetoric of “rigorous
clinical testing” in the study’s script makes
placebo sound like a medication in its own
right, or at least like something of attested
efficacy that “will help you as it has helped
so many others,” in the language of Park and
Covi. What of the benefits attributed to the
placebo treatment? While placebo produces
reports of improvement in countless clinical
trials (as when placebo branded as aspirin
outperformed its generic counterpart [22]),
the claim that such improvement represents
the work of “significant mind-body self-
healing processes” is arguably both tenden-
tious and inflated. Despite the inspirational
rhetoric of “healing,” the only sense in
which the study subjects treated with open
placebo were healed is that many of them
felt better. Their IBS itself did not heal in the
way ulcers, for example, do — with or with-
out treatment. According to the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary, the first meaning of “to
heal” is “to make whole or sound in bodily
condition; to free from disease or ailment,
restore to health or soundness; to cure.”
Placebo treatments of IBS do none of this.
Given that the evidence suggests that place-
bos do not in fact stimulate the body’s ca-
pacity for repair, as some champions of the
placebo effect maintain, but act on symp-
toms only [23], given that the IBS experi-
ment accordingly measured improvement of
symptoms and that we hear nothing further
of “self-healing” after the study subjects are
primed to expect it — given all this, we may
question just how transparent the presenta-
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tion of the placebo actually was in this offi-
cially transparent experiment.
A defender of “placebos without decep-
tion” might ask what harm there can be in a
slight exaggeration that does, in fact, make
for a reduction of distress. However, the
same defense might be made of some of the
studies faulted by M and K for their use of
misleading statements and tactical conceal-
ments.
the CARe effeCt
The Park and Covi experiment had 14
completers; the “placebos without decep-
tion” study had 31 completers in the treat-
ment group. The IBS study involving rectal
distension, along with deliberately ambigu-
ous “verbal suggestions” deemed truthful by
the authors, had 13 subjects. In addition to
the ADHD study already mentioned, which
enrolled 70 children, a related study reported
in 2007 enrolled 26 [24]. Compared to
placebo responders in conventional clinical
trials, these 154 persons represent a modest
grand total, surely. Beecher’s paper of 1955
took as its database 15 trials with a total of
1,082 patients. Open placebos do not seem
to be much of a practical possibility.
But this is not to deny that research into
the placebo effect (as distinguished from trials
where placebos serve as controls) has yielded
rich results. Among its intriguing findings is
that a drug administered in full view of the pa-
tient is markedly more effective than the same
drug administered covertly; the first engages
expectations — as well as the evocative power
of ritual, perhaps — while the second does
not. (By the same token, saline solution pre-
sented to a patient as a drug may trigger an ef-
fect but will be less potent than the drug itself
openly administered; in the latter case, the
placebo effect is supplemented, if you will, by
the drug’s specific activity.) In contrast to
studies that turn upon deceptions and semi-de-
ceptions, findings like these point to the ben-
efits of transparency. If a drug seen to be
administered by a doctor or nurse has a greater
effect than the same quantity of drug admin-
istered secretly, perhaps care in and of itself
has a therapeutic effect.
A care effect may have been silently im-
ported into the IBS study involving rectal
balloons when the patients’ own doctor con-
ferred with them before the pain procedure
and, in fact, went on to perform it. By con-
trast, a care effect is explicitly built into the
study of “placebos without deception.” A
secondary finding of the study, one which
has not attracted much attention or com-
ment, is that 35 percent of the subjects who
received nothing but supportive care re-
ported adequate relief of IBS, as compared
with 59 percent of those who received the
active treatment — in this case, a placebo
pill. That those in the treatment group re-
ceived the same care raises the possibility
that much or even most of the relief they re-
ported was attributable not to the pill per se
(despite its seeming centrality) but the con-
text of sympathetic care in which it was
given and received. Moreover, fully 76 per-
cent of those in the care-only group were
well enough satisfied with the result that
they did not regret being denied the placebo
pill as a result of randomization. Evidently,
it is possible to deliver care itself in a way
that produces a potent placebo effect — in
the process, solving the issue of deception
by rendering it completely moot. On the
other hand, a placebo prescribed to get the
patient out the door — as in Denmark,
where the most common reported reason for
using placebo is to give the appearance of
doing something when “the doctor feels
there is no time for a detailed explanation or
lengthy discussion” — can short-circuit care
itself [25].
The Park and Covi study of open place-
bos contains case notes, many of which sug-
gest the importance of the context of care in
which the giving of placebo was embedded.
Patient A “wanted to stay with the same doc-
tor,” as did Patient C. Patient T, though con-
vinced that his pill contained no active
ingredient, “had a strong positive reaction to
the therapist;” patient U, though likewise con-
vinced, “was very satisfied with the idea of
staying with the same doctor and pills.” Patient
H reported, “Every time I took a pill I thought
of my doctor,” and Patient S said, “For people,
each time they take a pill it’s a symbol ... of
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someone caring about you.” Perhaps the les-
son of the experiment is not that inert pills lend
themselves to ethical use but that care itself is
such a potent influence that it can endow an
inert pill with a semblance of activity.
The theory that care per se contributes
importantly to the placebo effect was tested
in a study of IBS conducted 2 years prior to
the “placebos without deception” trial. Un-
like the latter, in which the treatment and no-
treatment groups received the same
supportive care, in this instance one group re-
ceived placebo treatment (sham acupuncture)
with only minimal care, while the other re-
ceived the same treatment augmented with
care described as “warm and empathetic.” (In
sharp contrast to the practice of using placebo
to get rid of the patient, the care protocol in
this case called for an initial visit of 45 min-
utes with a practitioner.) The proportions of
patients reporting “moderate or substantial
improvement on the global improvement
scale” at 3 weeks were 20 percent for the
placebo-treatment-only group and 37 percent
for the group that enjoyed empathetic care in
addition to the placebo treatment [26].
We may note that this study of separate
components of the placebo effect deceived
subjects into thinking they received
acupuncture (the device used did not actu-
ally pierce the skin) and concealed its own
purpose. The “informed consent” given by
the subjects turns out to have been consid-
erably less than informed:
All participants gave written
informed consent, but the consent
disclosure omitted certain descrip-
tors of the trial to protect the
study’s scientific validity. Thus,
participants were told that the trial
was a placebo controlled study of
acupuncture for irritable bowel
syndrome and were completely un-
aware of the study’s primary aim to
examine placebo effects.
The study thus falls into the pattern of using
the very act of disclosure as a mechanism of
deception. However, other aspects of the
study point in fruitful directions. Taking its
lead from this one, a study could disaggre-
gate placebo and care, such that one group
received an open placebo in the context of
minimal care and another group attentive
care but no placebo. Other studies could
tease out the elements of attentive care itself
so that clinicians might know which prac-
tices best promote good outcomes. Given
that “benefits of standard medical treatments
have two components, the specific effects of
the treatment itself and the perception that
the therapy is being given” [27], how best to
foster the perception of care? In view of our
keen responsiveness to words in a medical
setting, how might a doctor or nurse explain
a treatment? And how much listening should
they ideally do? Open placebos may or may
not have much application in clinical medi-
cine, but good practices of care certainly do
— by definition. Misleading consent lan-
guage and suggestive double-entendres
jeopardize the ethical framework of medi-
cine, while good practices of care strengthen
it. Research into the placebo effect would do
well to turn to the investigation of such prac-
tices.
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